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Abstract 
This essay develops a model of democratic representation from the standpoint of epistemic 
theories of democracy. Such theories justify democracy in terms of its tendency to yield 
decisions that “track the truth” by integrating asymmetrically dispersed knowledge.  From an 
epistemic point of view, I suggest, democratic representatives are best modeled as epistemic 
intermediaries who facilitate the vertical integration of knowledge between policy experts and 
non-experts, and the horizontal integration of knowledge among diverse non-experts. The 
primary analytical payoff of this model is that it provides a clear rationale for variation in the 
norms and institutionalization of representative behavior.  Sometimes a delegate-like approach is 
the right one, and sometimes a trustee-like approach is better.  The key determinant is the effect 
of these models on the epistemic quality of outcomes under different circumstances.  Towards 
the end of the essay, I apply the model to the present revival of populism and consider its 
implications in that context. 
 
1. The View From the Fulton Neighborhood Zoning Committee 
As a newly appointed member of the Fulton Neighborhood Zoning Committee in 
Minneapolis, I recently had my first inside glimpse – albeit extremely limited – of the democratic 
process.1  Our little group participated in sometimes heated deliberations over Minneapolis’s 
“2040 Plan,” a legally required document that lays out a vision for the city over the next couple 
                                                
1 I am grateful to Jane Mansbridge and Daniel Viehoff for helpful feedback on this paper.  I 
also benefited from comments and discussion among the participants at the 2018 NOMOS 
Conference on “Democratic Failure” at the Boston University School of Law. 
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of decades.  It spells out commitments to goals such as social equity, economic growth, 
livability, and sustainability, and articulates in somewhat broad terms a series of initiatives 
towards those goals.  
After submitting an initial draft of the plan to the public, the city created an extensive open-
comment period, seeking feedback through various forums and media.  Public input in this 
process has been voluminous: The last time I checked, citizens had submitted 1682 comments 
through online forms, along with another 250+ emailed comments, and presumably many more 
comments at in-person forums.2  A very large share of these comments consist in poorly 
informed rants rather than thoughtful positions supported by evidence.  Citizens pick out specific 
details and attack them without considering the broader context.  They badly misrepresent what 
is in the plan.  They ignore the interests of other constituents with compelling concerns.  They 
make assertions about complex empirical matters without, apparently, consulting any credible 
research.  What is the effect of building luxury housing on housing prices over all?  What kinds 
of housing subsidies are most likely to promote an increase in affordable housing supply?  How 
do changes in parking supply downtown affect commuter patterns?  Hypocrisy and 
lazy/inconsistent arguments abound, and the incentives for responsible engagement are pretty 
weak.  To be sure, one can also find thoughtful and well researched perspectives.  But that is the 
exception rather than the norm, and the general perspective one gets on citizen-representative 
interchange does not flatter the democratic process. 
For better and worse, the comments will surely have some effect on the ultimate outcome.  
Yet a large share of the people who have submitted comments will come away with the view that 
                                                
2 https://minneapolis2040.com/received-public-comments/ 
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the politicians and planners are “not listening” to them.  They will think this because those who 
must weigh all of the relevant considerations will realize that acting on the stated concerns of 
most citizens would (for various reasons unfamiliar to the citizens themselves) be a really bad 
idea and because, in any case, there are too many incompatible objectives in play to 
accommodate all of those concerns practically.  But when confronted with the difference 
between what they as individuals called for and the policy that resulted, many citizens will 
complain that their elected agents are contemptuous of the public.   
The example draws our attention to some important tensions in the practice and ideal of 
democratic representation.  On the one hand, the guiding idea of a representative system is that, 
in order to reliably serve citizens’ interests, we need to create mechanisms through which their 
input is sought.  Input is important on the presumption that we cannot really understand what 
serves citizens’ interests without an egalitarian process of regular and extensive consultation.  On 
the other hand, democratic citizens are frequently ill-informed and narrow in their sympathies 
and motivations.  The first consideration explains, at least in part, why serving citizens’ interests 
requires a representative system rather than technocracy.  The second consideration explains, at 
least in part, why it requires a representative system rather than direct democracy.   
My suggestion in this essay is that a representative political system presents a solution that 
navigates two different kinds of epistemic problems: first, the risk that citizens will be ignored; 
second, the risk that they will be ignorant.  The first risk pulls us toward more delegate-like 
systems of representation: more direct forms of citizen involvement and greater deference among 
official representatives.  The second pulls us toward more trustee-like models: less direct citizen 
involvement and more independence of representatives.  Admittedly, the trustee/delegate 
distinction is a bit worn.  Nonetheless, it offers a useful rubric for representing this fundamental 
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tension in democracy - between citizen involvement on the one hand and expertise on the other.  
From an epistemic point of view, I suggest, democratic representatives are best modeled as 
epistemic intermediaries who facilitate the vertical integration of knowledge between policy 
experts and non-experts, and the horizontal integration of knowledge among diverse non-experts.  
The primary analytical payoff of this model is that it provides a clear rationale for variation in 
the norms and institutionalization of representative behavior.  Sometimes a delegate-like 
approach is the right one, and sometimes a trustee-like approach is better.  The key determinant 
is the effect of these models on the epistemic quality of outcomes under different circumstances.  
Towards the end of the essay, I apply the model to the present case of populism and consider its 
implications in that context. 
One caveat before moving forward: quite plausibly, there are significant non-epistemic 
considerations of procedural fairness and legitimacy which bear on the justification and character 
of representative institutions.  Below, my working assumption is that, while procedural 
considerations may constrain or in some cases trump epistemic concerns, these two approaches 
are normally compatible.  Indeed, one important upshot of my argument is that epistemic 
considerations are generally supportive of a system of democratic representation and, in this 
way, do not push us toward non-democratic models of elitism (as has frequently been argued3). 
                                                
3 E.g., Jason Brennan, Against Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
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2. The Distinctive Epistemic Challenge of Democracy 
Epistemic models of democracy hold that democracy is to be recommended at least in part 
based on its tendency to produce decision outcomes that “track the truth.”4  Democracy’s 
characteristic norms and procedures can then be explained and justified by reference to their 
contribution to this outcome.  Some epistemic democrats, for example, have appealed to formal 
work on the wisdom of crowds to explain why democratic decision-making would beat 
aristocracy under the right conditions.5 The idea of political truth invites a variety of worries that 
have been addressed elsewhere,6 but on my view its significance has been overstated amongst 
epistemic democrats.  In Joshua Cohen’s classic formulation of epistemic democracy, the key 
notion is not political truth but, instead, the idea of a “standard of correct decisions” which is 
independent “of current consensus and the outcomes of votes.”7  On this view, the key 
consideration is a certain notion of objectivity in our understanding of good decision outcomes, 
i.e., a measure of normative distance between whatever decision it is that citizens actually 
                                                
4 Robert E. Goodin and Kai Spiekermann, An Epistemic Theory of Democracy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018); Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective 
Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013); David 
M. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2008); Joshua Cohen, "An Epistemic Conception of Democracy," Ethics 97, 
no. 1 (1986). 
5 Landemore, Democratic Reason.  
6 Estlund, Democratic Authority. 
7 Cohen, "An Epistemic Conception of Democracy," 34. 
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endorse or decide upon through the political process and what it is that would constitute a correct 
decision.8  That kind of independent standard might be provided by some sort of strongly realist 
notion of political truth; but it might also be provided by constructivist alternatives, according to 
which correct outcomes are the ones that would be agreed upon under idealized conditions of 
deliberation, for example.9 
In any case, for present purposes, let us say that an epistemic notion of democracy is one 
which recommends democracy, at least in part, based on its tendency to produce decision 
outcomes that correspond to the right objective standard.  Why would democracy tend to do that?  
It would tend to do that, most crucially, if the kind of knowledge required to best approximate 
objectively correct outcomes were very widely dispersed among the citizenry.  And that 
assumption looks quite plausible at least on certain baseline liberal assumptions: First, a basic 
principle of equality according to which no one’s interests are intrinsically worthy of more 
weight in decision-making than anyone else’s. And, second, the idea that citizens have a 
fundamental interest in their own liberty, i.e., at a minimum, a life that reflects their own non-
coerced values and ambitions, consistent with a similar scope of liberty for others. Respecting 
these two basic principles might in principle be possible with some non-democratic model. 
However, as I explain below, it looks nearly impossible to attend effectively and fairly to 
disparate interests without a process of intensive, ongoing, and egalitarian consultation.   
                                                
8 Michael Fuerstein, "Democratic Consensus as an Essential Byproduct," Journal of Political 
Philosophy 22, no. 3 (2014). 
9 Estlund, Democratic Authority. 
 7 
 So the general appeal of democratic systems lies in their capacity to integrate widely and 
asymmetrically dispersed knowledge about political matters.10  Yet neither of the two dominant 
mechanisms of democratic agency – voting and deliberation – is likely on its own to succeed in 
this regard.  Voting is inadequate because, on its own, it has a frequent tendency to amplify 
rather than remedy ignorance.  If citizens individually know a fraction of what they need to know 
about climate policy to make good decisions, for example, the majority perspective is unlikely to 
represent a rational outlook.  On its own, voting also does a poor job of integrating disparate 
information.  If four voters know about four different successful business deals conducted by 
Donald Trump, and the fifth knows about a fifth deal in which he ripped off his suppliers, went 
into bankruptcy, committed tax fraud, and got bailed out with a $50 million gift from his father, 
then a substantial majority will conclude that he is a brilliant and ethically upstanding business 
man.  Aggregating their knowledge through an election will not yield epistemic benefits. This 
point extends to complicated policy problems in which developing an informed view requires 
attending to disparate considerations.  Whatever its epistemic merits, voting on its own is not a 
reliable route to the “wisdom of crowds” in political contexts. 
Inclusive deliberation is a tempting solution to this problem, since deliberation enables 
individuals to upgrade their perspective in the light of asymmetrically dispersed information.11  
But even under the best of circumstances, there are severe practical limitations to the prospects 
of universal deliberation given the size of contemporary democracies and the range of challenges 
                                                
10 Michael Fuerstein, "Epistemic Democracy and the Social Character of Knowledge," 
Episteme 5, no. 1 (2008). 
11 Elizabeth Anderson, "The Epistemology of Democracy," Episteme 3, no. 1-2 (2006). 
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they face.  The “deliberative systems”  approach presents an important move towards addressing 
that challenge within deliberative democracy,12 but remains an incomplete solution at best.  
Relatedly, the ideal of inclusive egalitarian deliberation at best abstracts away from the 
inevitability, and utility, of epistemic hierarchies.  The division of cognitive labor is essential 
when matters become complex,13 and no system of decision making can succeed without some 
rational, structural reliance on expertise.14 
From an epistemic point of view, then, representation most naturally enters this picture as a 
means of assimilating disparate input about citizens’ interests into a process of shared decision-
making.  Representatives play a particular role in the democratic system that works in tandem 
with voting and deliberation to improve epistemic outputs.  Andrew Rehfeld characterizes the 
“standard” understanding of political representation in terms of what he dubs the “interest and 
responsiveness” account.  This involves two components: 
“(i) To advance, seek, or pursue another person’s or group’s interests; and/or  
                                                
12 John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge, Deliberative Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
13 John Hardwig, "The Role of Trust in Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 88, no. 12 
(1991). 
14 Alfred Moore, Critical Elitism: Deliberation, Democracy, and the Problem of Expertise 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
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(ii) in a manner responsive to that other person or group.”15 
I will treat this “standard” account as a baseline for present purposes.16  From a procedural point 
of view, there is a moral good achieved by giving individuals a say in decision-making.  The key 
point is that, in a political context, there is no authoritative vantage point from which to identify 
correct decisions.  So it is essential to avoid unjustly privileging any particular individual’s 
view(s).17  In this respect, there are clear merits, on grounds of fairness, to having a democratic 
representative system. 
Nonetheless, even though the correct outcome of political processes may be essentially 
contested, we can legitimately critique that process for failing on epistemic grounds: the majority 
opinion may be supported by fallacious reasoning, it may hinge on lies or misrepresentations, it 
may be premised on overconfidence about poorly understood information, and it may blatantly 
ignore the vital interests of particular groups with a stake in the process.  These are all essentially 
epistemic considerations, because they recruit normative criteria of reasoning and justification 
which are independent of actual beliefs and procedural outputs and, for that matter, moral 
characteristics of procedures, such as the extent to which all individuals have an equal say. 
                                                
15 Andrew Rehfeld, "On Representing," The Journal of Political Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2018): 
216. 
16 Rehfeld’s objective, in fact, is to argue that, for various reasons, these conditions are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for representation. However, his particular concerns do not bear 
significantly on the approach developed here. 
17 Estlund, Democratic Authority. 
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From a procedural point of view, representation is a way of realizing the equal moral status 
of citizens in political decision-making.  In epistemic terms, designating people to advance the 
interests of particular groups of citizens helps ensure that the full spectrum of considerations 
which are relevant to justifying policy outcomes are in fact considered.  Economic policy which 
only consults wealthy people is unlikely to fairly and effectively serve all citizens’ interests.  
Parallel points apply to education policy which only consults city-dwellers, technological 
regulation which only consults industry, and so forth.  This rationale has long been a pillar of 
democratic thought.18  
In particular, it is worth noting a couple of crucial reasons why – given the presumption of 
liberty and equality – producing correct outcomes is likely to depend on wide egalitarian 
consultation:  
The first is that the content of any individual’s legitimate interests is desire-sensitive.  That 
is, following a standard liberal understanding of well-being, what is good for me depends to a 
large degree on what I actually desire and aspire to. Religious believers, for example, have a 
compelling interest in the capacity to practice their religion in virtue of their subjective attitudes 
towards religious doctrine and practice; caring about and engaging with these things in a 
particular way gives them an interest in the capacity to practice their religion.  Likewise, same-
sex couples have a compelling interest in the right to marriage in significant part because of the 
existence of genuine and deep-seated desires to participate in that institution. The defense of 
same-sex marriage would be incomplete without this fact about contingent human attitudes and 
                                                
18 John Stuart Mill, "Considerations on Representative Government," in On Liberty and 
Other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
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affections.  All things held equal, getting what we desire is generally good for us, and the 
contingent shape of human desires plays a fundamental constitutive role in determining our 
interests. 
The second reason that producing correct outcomes depends on wide egalitarian consultation 
is that interests are fact-sensitive.  That is, what is good for me depends substantially on features 
of the world beyond my subjective state of mind.  If I am allergic to penicillin, then it is against 
my interests to take penicillin, even if I desire it or believe that it’s good for me.  On a political 
scale, manufacturing workers may believe that tariffs are going to be good for them while, in 
fact, they will produce unforeseen consequences which make them worse off.  Wide consultation 
tends to be important, therefore, because citizens have an incomplete epistemic perspective on 
the facts relevant to their interests.  A process that is properly sensitive to our interests should be 
one that ensures the chance for all relevant factual information to receive uptake. 
The fact-sensitivity of interests entails that democracy requires an enormous body of 
scientific knowledge, where this encompasses natural and social-scientific, as well as other 
bodies of technical knowledge.19  Democracy requires, we might say, the downward vertical 
integration of knowledge from experts into the decision-making process.  The Minneapolis 2040 
plan illustrates this well, since competently assessing the plan requires drawing on a vast array of 
economic, sociological, and ecological concerns and integrating them coherently and 
intelligently.  There are undoubtedly some types of policy questions for which more mundane 
                                                
19 Michael Fuerstein, "Epistemic Trust and Liberal Justification," Journal of Political 
Philosophy 21, no. 2 (2013); Moore, Critical Elitism; Philip Kitcher, The Ethical Project 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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forms of knowledge suffice (How should we renovate park facilities?  Should the school system 
expand its investment in the arts?).  Nonetheless, many core legislative issues hinge on complex 
scientific matters.  The present debate surrounding health care reform in the United States is a 
telling example.  This debate tends to inspire strong positions on all sides, even though there is 
enormous uncertainty about the ultimate results, costs, and tradeoffs of different policies.  The 
difficulty of the underlying issues surpasses that of string theory so far as I can tell, yet voters are 
practically screaming at their representatives (and each other) about what ought to be done.  
At the same time, citizens tend to know factual qualities of their local situation which are 
relevant to their interests, but which are not well known by elites operating at a remove.  
Democracy thus requires upward vertical integration – from non-experts into the decision-
making process – of knowledge as well.  The efficacy of health care policy, for example, is 
sensitive to highly localized needs and sociological dynamics: who winds up in the emergency 
room and why?  Where are the cost-overruns most extreme?  What kinds of care are most needed 
and for which populations?  How do racial and economic inequalities play out in the provision of 
care?  There is a long history of poor decision-making by policy elites who are not sufficiently 
familiar with the localized conditions under which policy is to be implemented, and with the 
concerns of those most directly affected by it.  Education policy provides a particularly rich 
abundance of examples on this point.  High level reforms, such as “No Child Left Behind” in the 
United States, impose sweeping measures to address problems which are enormously 
heterogeneous at the local level.  The inevitable result is a variety of perverse incentives and 
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unintended consequences, of which “teaching to the test” is (in this case) only the most notorious 
example.20   
In the Minneapolis 2040 case, citizens tend to offer up perspectives grounded in what is 
likely to happen on their block without weighing the needs of those in neighborhoods that are 
different in their demographics, housing stock, transportation needs, and economic prosperity.  
Voters defending gun rights in a rural context seem at best dimly aware of the consequences in 
poor urban neighborhoods.  Voters angry about environmental regulations on water usage tend to 
forget or ignore what happens downstream.  The challenge in a political system that is supposed 
to treat all citizens equally is to assimilate their interests across a heterogeneous population.  This 
is the problem of the horizontal integration of knowledge.  We need an interchange between 
experts and non-experts, but we also need an interchange among different types of experts and, 
especially, among diverse non-experts.  In this context, the problem is not only to generate a 
sufficient awareness of the diversity of interest-relevant facts, but also the diversity of interest-
relevant desires across the population.  Here again the same-sex marriage case looks like an 
important example.  The compelling interest of same-sex couples in marital rights, I noted above, 
derives to a significant degree from the particular set of aspirations and attitudes attached to the 
institution of marriage by a substantial portion of the gay community. 
To summarize: democracy is epistemically demanding because serving interests fairly and 
effectively requires integrating knowledge across a large and heterogeneous population.  This 
integration concerns both interest-relevant facts – about scientific matters and also local practical 
                                                
20 Linda Darling-Hammond, "Race, Inequality, and Educational Accountability: The Irony of 
‘No Child Left Behind’," Race Ethnicity and Education 10, no. 3 (2008). 
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constraints – and contingent desires which generate interests as a function of variable plans, 
attitudes, and commitments.  The integration required must flow from experts toward the broader 
system of decision-making (downward vertical integration), from non-experts toward that 
system (upward vertical integration) and between non-experts at different social locations 
(horizontal integration).  If, on the standard account, the fundamental task of representation is 
the advancement of interests, then we can understand representatives as occupying a distinctive 
role which facilitates these different kinds of epistemic integration.  That is the suggestion which 
I pursue in the next section. 
3. Democratic Representatives as Epistemic Intermediaries 
The Minneapolis 2040 website describes a variety of means through which the public is 
being engaged to provide feedback on the plan throughout its development, but does not offer 
much detail on the actual steps by which a draft was produced.  Still, we can imagine what 
Mansbridge calls (see this journal issue) a “recursive” process of deliberation among Council 
Members, the public, and the planners.  A somewhat simplified version of the ideal goes like 
this: the perspective of elected Council Members is informed by their engagement with citizens; 
the Council Members in turn make some judgments about collective priorities of their 
constituents and channel those to the planners; the planners draw on their expertise to identify 
crucial practical issues, constraints, and tensions; the Council Members channel those points 
back to their constituents in public forums; the public then has a chance to respond; and so forth. 
Although, in this case, there will be no public referendum vote on the plan, it is reasonable to 
assume that the City Council would be unlikely to move forward with the ratification of any 
particular plan until a draft garners substantial public support across a range of constituencies.   
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The role of the public in this case is primarily one of providing feedback which is then 
integrated by planners, along with various technical considerations, into crafting further drafts of 
the plan.  Taking this as a fairly standard case of democratic representation, two aspects of public 
input in this case are worth noting:   
First, public input is collectively valuable but highly incomplete at the individual level. The 
value of public input tends to emerge through the accumulation of diverse perspectives that are 
individually incomplete on their own.  In Minneapolis, developers have one particular set of 
issues in mind; African-American renters on the North side of town have another; white home-
owners in the affluent neighborhoods in the southwestern part of town have yet another; 
businesses downtown will raise yet another; those who commute to work every day have a 
different perspective on transportation issues than those who work from home; and so on.  A 
good planning document will integrate all of these perspectives along with a broad spectrum of 
technical considerations.  But that is principally the task of the technocrats in the planning 
department – in dialogue with City Council Members – rather than one for individual citizens. 
Most individual citizens will be poorly positioned to perform this integrative task, due to 
inevitable deficiencies of both scientific knowledge and knowledge of other citizens’ interests.  
This corresponds to the need, described earlier, for horizontal and downward vertical integration. 
Second, much of the process which determines the final document takes place off stage, in 
the nitty gritty technical deliberations of the technocrats who set the agenda.  By the time the 
general public reaches a point where it is positioned to exercise some kind of direct 
authorization, the considerations in play, the kinds of measures proposed, and the defining aims 
of the document will have already been substantially framed and narrowed down. There will be 
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no direct public vote on the planning document. Still, even if there were such a vote, the public’s 
choice would be substantially shaped by the construction of available options.   
Both of these considerations underscore the fundamental difficulty with the idea that 
representative democracy is an attempt to approximate, within practical constraints, an ideal of 
self-rule or, as Mansbridge puts it (see her contribution to this journal issue), “giving a law to 
oneself.”  The idea of citizens giving laws to themselves depends on a parallel idea of citizens 
adequately informed and engaged to do this competently, that is, to meet democracy’s epistemic 
demands.  That model of democracy looks most plausible in contexts like Ancient Greece, 
Rousseau’s Geneva, or perhaps Mansbridge’s small town New England.21  In these cases, the 
democratic franchise applied to a manageably small group of citizens, and the geographic and 
population units over which authority had to be exercised was comparatively miniscule.  
Likewise, the kind of scientific knowledge required for policy in these contexts does not match 
its degree of sophistication in contemporary national contexts. 
The defining features of the 2040 plan process are that individual citizens tend to be poorly 
positioned to make complete legislative judgments on their own. Likewise, the choices that 
individuals make in this case – even technical experts – are highly shaped and constrained by 
                                                
21 Josiah Ober, Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Helena Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva: 
From the First Discourse to the Social Contract 1749-1762 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997); Jane Mansbridge, "Reconstructing Democracy," in Revisioning the Political: 
Feminist Reconstructions of Traditional Concepts in Western Political Theory, ed. Nancy J. 
Hirschmann and Christine Di Stefano (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). 
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distributed processes of agenda-setting, theory-building, and knowledge production.  The 
conclusions of urban planners, engineers, and school administrators are themselves premised on 
a broader web of background theories and assumptions that have been developed within those 
fields, and which serve to shape decision-making in fundamental ways.  From this point of view, 
the input of individual citizens is best understood as a certain kind of participation in a collective, 
but highly distributed process of inquiry and choice.22  We shouldn’t aspire to be authors of the 
laws because civic and political maturity requires understanding ourselves as participants in a 
collective, systemic process, rather than as direct authors of outcomes.  The goal of democratic 
participation, on this view, is not that citizens be heard or exercise oversight exclusively for its 
own sake; the goal is that citizens be heard because and to the extent that doing so will create 
policies that fairly respect the interests of all. 
Yet though democratic decision-making is by nature an output of the system, rather than 
individuals, it also clearly depends on individuals within the system who play a crucial role in 
bringing together disparate bodies of knowledge.  My suggestion is that democratic 
representatives occupy an institutional location which makes them distinctly well suited to play 
such a role.  Representatives have formal power to participate in policy decisions, and are at the 
same time accountable to constituents via elections.  This puts them in a natural mediating 
position between experts and non-experts.  The nitty-gritty of policy depends on scientific 
knowledge and, therefore, representatives must have a grip on the relevant technical 
considerations.  At the same time, their accountability to constituents generates incentives to 
bring these technicalities into dialogue with the perspective of citizens “on the ground.” 
                                                
22 Fuerstein, "Epistemic Democracy and the Social Character of Knowledge." 
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Likewise, they must communicate the technical perspective of experts so that policy is seen by 
non-experts to serve their interests.  Representatives also must engage in a substantial 
deliberative negotiation with representatives of other constituents. In this respect, they must 
fairly assimilate the interests of other groups in a way that is, once again, seen by their own 
constituents as interest-advancing.   
It is important to note that the role that representatives play in this context is both 
informational and motivational.  As described above, their informational role is evident enough: 
representatives create an institutional channel through which asymmetrically dispersed 
information is circulated.  But circulating information, on its own, is only part of the challenge in 
improving the epistemic quality of decisions.  In a variety of familiar ways, political officials, 
expert technocrats, and non-expert citizens are all highly imperfect in the way that they process 
and act on information. Most obviously, self-interest has a tendency to crowd out a due regard 
for the interests of others, even given full information about the stakes.  But even where naked 
self-interest is not the rule, implicit biases, motivated reasoning, and narrow group-based 
affections and antipathies tend to work against the epistemic reliability of individuals.  Political 
representatives act as significant focal points for a process of contestation that enables 
individuals, not only to represent information, but also to give it salience and some measure of 
motivational significance.  Of course, as the present case of populism reveals, political 
representation is hardly a fail-safe in encouraging epistemic responsibility (more on this below).  
Nonetheless, a system of representation, backed by egalitarian norms and basic civil liberties, 
creates mechanisms that enable citizens to mobilize reasons and hold one another to account on 
their basis.   
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Thus, the formal power of representatives, combined with their accountability to constituents, 
makes them natural epistemic intermediaries: entities which facilitate the vertical and horizontal 
integration of politically vital knowledge.  That kind of role appears to be indispensable in the 
context of contemporary democracy given the epistemic inadequacy (as I argued earlier) of mass 
voting or deliberation on its own.  When representatives perform well in their role they will 
succeed, not only in persuading constituents that they are fairly and effectively advancing their 
interests, but also in fairly and effectively advancing their interests as a matter of objective fact.  
It is in this latter respect that the epistemic perspective is important.  The ultimate criterion of 
whether the representative system is failing or succeeding, on this approach, is to look at the 
extent to which decisions correspond to objective standards of fairness and efficacy.  And the 
appropriate norms governing representatives take on a strictly functional character: they can be 
assessed and calibrated by reference to their tendency to achieve epistemic improvements in the 
system’s outputs.  It is possible that there are alternatives to the representative system that might 
perform better from an epistemic point of view.23  But as I argued above, the presumption of 
liberty and equality as foundational values creates very strong pressures towards an approach 
that balances wide consultation with rational deference to experts.    
 Thinking about representatives as epistemic intermediaries offers us a fresh way of 
approaching some of the debates that have surrounded representation in democratic theory.  As I 
noted earlier, the classic formulation of that debate lies in the “trustee” vs “delegate” dispute.  
The essential question in that context is this: to what extent does good representation entail 
                                                
23 Brennan, Against Democracy; Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy 
and the Limits of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
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deference to the expressed desires and judgments of constituents on the one hand, versus the 
autonomous exercise of a representative’s own evaluations on the other? Are representatives 
obliged principally to pursue their independent judgments about how to advance constituents’ 
interests, tutored by their own informed understanding of the common good (a trustee model), or 
are they obliged principally to bring forth the concerns of their constituents as understood and 
articulated by the constituents themselves (a delegate model)?  From an epistemic point of view, 
the answer is that “it depends.”  In some contexts, very substantial deference to the expressed 
views of constituents is the best way of contributing to the fair and effective service of their 
interests while, in others, a more independent mode of judgment and deliberation is 
appropriate.24 
One obvious consideration favoring a more trustee-style role would be the relevance of 
highly technical considerations which are difficult for non-experts to competently assimilate to 
their perspective.  The complex fact-sensitivity of interests pushes us toward granting 
representatives greater autonomy of judgment and behavior.  Again, the recent debate about 
health care reform in the United States hinges on enormously complicated economic and human 
                                                
24 Goodin and Spiekermann offer their own very helpful discussion of this issue and endorse 
a similarly pluralistic conclusion An Epistemic Theory of Democracy, 244-59; "Epistemic 
Aspects of Representative Government," European Political Science Review 4, no. 3 (2012)., 
though that discussion arises within the specific context of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.  They 
are primarily concerned with the epistemic advantages of larger vs smaller bodies and do not 
address the way in which variations in the sources and types of politically relevant knowledge 
might imply advantages to one approach or another. 
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interactions among different components of the system.  Should we be asking non-experts for 
their judgments about the proper role of re-insurance, for example?  What about the 
determination of formularies, or the proper term of orphan drug exclusivity under patent law? 
Plausibly, a tutored mini-public of non-experts with access to curated information could form 
credible judgments on such issues.25  But simply bringing forth the voice of the mass public – 
serving as their “delegate” – is unlikely to serve anyone’s interests.  Those interests will be better 
served by representatives who can operate in relative (though not complete) insulation from the 
opinions of their constituents, because that kind of insulation is a better route to the integration of 
interest-relevant facts in this context.   
On the other hand, interests with a high level of desire-sensitivity would favor a more 
delegate-like approach.  A trivial kind of case might involve decisions about how to invest in 
different kinds of communal amenities.  Should the local park have tennis courts or a swimming 
pool?  Here, barring the existence of unusual complications, the interests of the community will 
be best served primarily by satisfying the contingent desires of the majority, such as it is.  Here 
the representative should function largely as a mouthpiece for the community.  The Minneapolis 
2040 plan illustrates a more complex variant on this sort of example.  Urban planning visions 
must rely on expert knowledge.  Yet they also cannot abstract away from the particularities of 
                                                
25 Annabelle Lever, "Democracy, Deliberation, and Public Service Reform," in Public 
Services: A New Reform Agenda, ed. Henry Kippin and Gary Stoker (New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2012); Philip Kitcher, Science in a Democratic Society (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus 
Books, 2011); James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public 
Consultation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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what people want from their city, what amenities they expect, what problems they see as most 
significant, and what kind of community life they see as valuable.   
Even in a seemingly trivial case like “swimming pool versus tennis courts,” things can 
quickly become complicated.  Tennis courts and swimming pools may cater to different kinds of 
people with different kinds of class interests and identities.  These options may have different 
social implications for the neighborhood in which they are constructed.  What if more people in 
the neighborhood want tennis courts, but there is a dearth of access to swimming for low income 
residents?  Do public parks have an obligation to provide amenities for the underserved?  How 
should that be weighed against the majority view?  Likewise, where will the resources come 
from to build the pool/tennis court?  Is this community in competition with another community 
for these resources?  Who has the more compelling claim and why?  Representatives who simply 
channel whatever is believed by the better portion of their constituents are unlikely to attend 
adequately to the broader context as they consider how to advance those constituents’ interests.   
From an epistemic point of view, most policy matters of interest will require moving between 
a trustee- and delegate-style role of deliberation.  The particular interest that citizens have in a 
good education, for example, depends in part on their conception of the good life and where/how 
education fits within that.  For this reason, successful representation requires channeling and 
understanding citizens’ core desires as they relate to a good life.  At the same time, designing a 
good education policy also requires attending to an institutional and scientific understanding of 
teaching models, the social dynamics of the classroom, budgetary and other practical constraints, 
and competing demands on resources.  Similar kinds of points can be made in the context of 
health care, economic, or housing policy.   
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Contributing to system outcomes that fairly and effectively serve interests in most cases 
requires moving between delegate- and trustee-styles of behavior.  A rigid dichotomy between 
these two approaches is difficult to reconcile with the wide variation among policy challenges 
and the kinds of intuitions that these disparate cases generate. An epistemic understanding of 
representation offers a clear account of this variation, and a justification for pluralism in our 
approach: if the goal is policy outputs which fairly and effectively serve interests, then different 
combinations of these two models are called for on different policy occasions among different 
publics.  Epistemic output has fact-sensitive dimensions, which is why simply channeling public 
attitudes will not do. At the same time, it has desire-sensitive dimensions, which is why pure 
trustee-models will not do either.  
Similar points apply in reference to other proposed models of representation.  For example, 
drawing on Mansbridge’s  terminology, is the proper approach to representation “anticipatory,” 
“promissory,” “gyroscopic,” or “surrogacy”?26  As she herself suggests, the answer is plausibly 
that “it depends.”  In some cases, it may be best for representatives to act as “gyroscopes” who 
are selected on the basis of core values and dispositions, and who then act more or less 
independently of their constituents’ day-to-day judgments.  That model sounds most plausible in 
contexts where a more trustee-like mode of engagement is appropriate.  “Promissory” models of 
representation – in which representatives are accountable to the particular set of commitments on 
which they were elected – may be most appropriate in cases where warranted confidence in the 
motives of representatives is low.  “Surrogate” representation – in which the shared social 
                                                
26 Jane Mansbridge, "Rethinking Representation," American Political Science Review 97, no. 
4 (2003). 
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identity of representatives and constituents is particularly significant – is attractive in contexts 
where there are strong identity-based disparities in power and interests, and where there are 
strongly desire-sensitive interests in play.   
Does good representation, as Suzanne Dovi suggests, fundamentally require preserving and 
promoting the autonomy of constituents to contest the decisions of representatives?27  From an 
epistemic point of view it undoubtedly does, primarily because such contestation facilitates a 
regular transfer of knowledge between constituents and their representatives.  Nonetheless, the 
idea of autonomy on its own substantially underdetermines the form and extent of contestation.  
To what degree should citizens be directly involved with the legislative process as opposed to 
granting appointed technocrats the discretion to operate behind closed doors?  Thinking about 
representation in epistemic terms allows us to answer this question by looking at the epistemic 
quality of the system’s decision outputs, and provides a clear justification for variation in the 
norms and institutional structure of representation.   
4. The Epistemic Failures of the New Populism 
In the terms considered above, one way of thinking about representatives who “don’t listen” 
is to say that there have been important failures of upward vertical integration in the epistemic 
system.  This is at least very plausibly true in the context of recent populist movements.  The 
core populist grievances have revolved around the economic and social effects of globalization.  
And while these grievances are partially grounded in falsehoods or severe distortions, there is 
also some legitimacy to them.  In the United States, a cluster of familiar considerations include: 
                                                
27 Suzanne Dovi, "Good Representatives Foster Autonomy," PS: Political Science and 
Politics 51, no. 2 (2018). 
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the increasing economic precariousness of lower and middle class workers,28 labor displacement 
resulting from technology and globalization,29 rising social and economic inequality,30 the 
dismantling of unions,31 and the asymmetric (Wall street vs “main street”) political response to 
the 2008 financial crisis.32  The idea that Trump offers a credible remedy to these problems is at 
best highly problematic, but the underlying grievances themselves reflect genuine failures of 
representation.  In general, the American representative system has been systematically 
unresponsive towards the concerns of lower-income voters.33 There is truth in the view that 
                                                
28 Jacob S. Hacker, The Great Risk Shift: The New Economic Insecurity and the Decline of 
the American Dream, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
29 David Autor, "The Polarization of Job Opportunities in the Us Labor Market: Implications 
for Employment and Earnings," Community Investments 23, no. 2 (2010). 
30 Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, "Inequality in the Long Run," Science 344, no. 6186 
(2014). 
31 Megan Dunn and James Walker, "Union Membership in the United States," U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics [Online], https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/union-membership-in-the-united-
states/pdf/union-membership-in-the-united-states.pdf 
32 Neil Barofsky, Bailout: An inside Account of How Washington Abandoned Main Street 
While Rescuing Wall Street (New York: Free Press, 2012). 
33 Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, 2nd 
ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
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Trump’s voters – at least the less affluent and less educated among them - have been 
“forgotten.”34 
What explains this representational failure?  In puzzling over the massive under-
representation of working class voters in American policy, Larry Bartels finds little support for 
what might otherwise seem to be plausible explanations of this phenomenon: that the wealthy are 
more informed or that they vote more.  The most straightforward explanation of available data, 
he speculates, may simply be the over-powering significance of money in funding electoral 
campaigns (though he notes the lack of clear evidence on this point).35  Nicholas Carnes observes 
                                                
34 Not all of Trump’s support is working class, of course. In the general election, only 35% of 
Trump voters had household incomes less than $50k, and some have argued on this and related 
grounds that the idea that Trump’s base is working class is a myth. See Nicholas Carnes and 
Noam Lupu, “It’s Time to Bust the Myth: Most Trump Voters Were Not Working Class,” The 
Washington Post, June 5, 2017 [Online], https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
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However, Trump’s political narrative is undeniably pitched in important respects towards the 
white working class, and his victory was critically propelled by shifts in support among this 
group.  Nate Silver’s analysis, for example, supports this claim with a focus on education levels: 
“Education, Not Income, Predicted Who Would Vote For Trump,” FiveThirtyEight, Nov. 22, 
2016 [Online], https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/education-not-income-predicted-who-would-
vote-for-trump/. See also Stephen L. Morgan and Jiwon Lee, "Trump Voters and the White 
Working Class," Sociological Science 5 (2018).   
35 Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, 267. 
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that working class citizens have never held more than 2% of Congressional seats in the United 
States.36  Pointing to systematic differences in the values and policy outlook of rich and working 
class citizens, he argues that the United States government has long been, in effect, a government 
“by the rich for the rich.”    
And why do the rich govern “for the rich”?  There are undoubtedly both motivational and 
informational issues in play.  Motivationally, class affiliation shapes our values and our 
perceptions of what matters and why.  Those who are more affluent and educated are likely to 
develop substantially different views about the appropriate policy course.37  And yet the more 
and less economically well off are also likely to have different pools of information about 
economic policy and its effects, insofar as that information is drawn from life experience and 
social networks.  These informational and motivational effects are not independent: caring more 
about the predicament of low-wage manufacturing workers is likely to induce one to gather more 
information about that predicament; and having more information about that predicament makes 
it more likely that one will care about it.   
One example of particular relevance here concerns the economic consequences of low-
skilled immigration in sectors such as farming and manufacturing.  Here is a somewhat 
speculative account of what is going on in that case.  On the one hand, the policy establishment 
                                                
36 Nicholas Carnes, The Cash Ceiling: Why Only the Rich Run for Office and What We Can 
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tends to emphasize the positive benefits of low-skilled immigration for economic growth.38  On 
the other, populists focus on wage suppression, arguing that immigrants are “stealing jobs.”  As 
George Borjas argues, however, both of these arguments are in some sense right: low-wage 
immigration is beneficial to the economy in the aggregate, but also tends to reduce the wages of 
low-skill native workers in the relevant industries by a few percentage points.39  To an affluent 
citizen, of course, a 2% drop in the wages of poultry plant workers may look like a small price to 
pay for higher aggregate growth.  For those already struggling to make ends meet, however, a 
2% wage cut may be very significant indeed.  The approach of U.S. economic policy appears to 
have been much more sensitive to the perspective of a typical affluent citizen in this regard. 40  
And that plausibly reflects an interplay between motivational elements on the one hand – more 
affluent citizens just don’t find a 2% wage drop among the working class to be particularly 
significant – and informational on the other – those who haven’t felt the acute economic 
                                                
38 See, for example, Eduardo Porter, “The Danger From Low-Skilled Immigrants: Not Having 
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vulnerabilities of low-skill workers may easily dismiss their concerns as mere racism without 
attending carefully to the economic facts. 
In this respect, the representative system is very clearly failing in its role as epistemic 
intermediary, and the rise of populism reflects that failure. Recent economic policy has not fairly 
and effectively served the interests of less educated and less skilled workers, and in this respect 
those workers are not being heard.  However, there is a second problem at work in this context.  
The problem is that the people complaining about not being heard are themselves not listening to 
others.  On any number of issues, scientific and social-scientific authority is conveniently 
ignored or twisted in politically convenient ways.  Journalists who report ideologically 
inconvenient facts are disparaged and threatened, and the idea of truth itself is often treated as a 
sort of political game.41 Indeed, this attitude toward experts, facts, and expertise is one of 
populism’s definitive features,42 and particularly of American populism. The epistemic quality of 
voters has always been shaky at best.43  What’s particularly striking about the present moment is 
the extent to which ignorance is a kind of willful and explicitly endorsed state.   
Most obviously, there is ignorance among populist voters of important scientific facts which 
bear on interests.  Believing that climate change is a “hoax” does not make it any less harmful to 
future generations. There is also ignorance of the disparate desires and particularities that define 
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interests across much of the population. Populists tend to focus on the concerns most salient to a 
particular demographic group of “true” Americans (or English, Hungarians, Italians, etc.) with 
little regard, and often active contempt, for the expressed concerns of large classes of their fellow 
citizens.44  To some degree, this can be seen as a failure of sympathy or moral motivation as 
much as ignorance.  But the complex of strong out-group hostility also sustains patterns of 
cognition and epistemic negligence which are constitutive of ignorance.  Populism is to a large 
degree defined by patterns of affect and epistemic cognition which are mutually reinforcing.45  
This point supports the idea that, as I have noted, systems of representation produce epistemic 
goods through both informational and motivational mechanisms: they create a means for 
disseminating information, but they also create a system of friction and contestation that 
encourages some measure of deliberative accountability. 
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Thus, if it is problematic that policy-makers and representatives are out of touch with 
important concerns of certain sectors of the public, then it is at least as problematic that 
“ordinary” constituents are themselves proudly ignorant of essential scientific facts, and likewise 
seem unable to represent the pressing concerns of other social groups.  This point applies broadly 
across democratic citizens, but is particularly compelling in the case of populism, which (a) 
explicitly rejects the authority of scientific experts and (b) is organized around forms of out-
grouping that degrade and marginalize the concerns of entire social classes.  So ignorance works 
in both directions between the “elites” who populist voters resent and those voters themselves.  
The policy outlook of elites has not been adequately shaped by the concerns of populist voters 
and, at the same time, those voters have not been adequately informed by elites’ knowledge.  
These voters are ignored, but they are also ignorant.  This dynamic is one central driver of the 
present democratic failure.   
Contrary to Pepe Grillo and other populists, representatives are not and should not be a direct 
voicebox for “what you want.”  That is because the epistemic challenge of democracy entails a 
correlative duty of listening and absorbing information from technical experts, along with others 
outside one’s district and/or social group.  As I have been suggesting, institutions of 
representation work well when they counter the inherently limited perspective of both non-expert 
constituents and technocratic policy designers.   
How should we think about these observations in light of the epistemic model of 
representation that we have been considering?  Mansbridge points to Michael Neblo, Kevin 
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Esterling, and David Lazer’s work with e-townhalls46 as an example of how high quality 
constituent-representative communication could be implemented.  She also mentions deliberative 
polling as an important model along these lines. Both of these examples involve highly 
structured forums for input in which citizens engage with high quality expert information and are 
obliged to listen and respond in a thoughtful manner.  The benefit of communication in these 
contexts depends as much on the pro-social incentives and engagement created as the way in 
which information is transferred.  In other words, the primary problem solved is not that citizens 
are ignored but that they are ignorant.  The deliberative forum encourages them to become 
engaged and informed, and to exercise appropriate deference to those who know more than they 
about technical matters. 
The examples of deliberative polling and e-townhalls suggest that there are potentially 
powerful complementarities between institutional mechanisms which facilitate upward, 
downward, and horizontal epistemic integration at the same time.  The complementarities exist 
because the institutional structure of high quality deliberation strongly encourages the disposition 
both towards listening and towards rational deference to credible authority.  Democratic 
representation is not intrinsically necessary to facilitate that kind of process.  Nonetheless, as I 
noted earlier, representatives create a formal target for the uptake of relevant perspectives into 
the decision-making process.  In that way, the existence of representatives creates an institutional 
context for mutual engagement that would not exist in an undemocratic system, but which would 
also not be scalable and sustainable in a purely plebiscitary democracy.   
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However, the general lesson of this paper has been that there is no completely generalizable 
model for an epistemically healthy model of representation, and this clearly applies to an 
assessment of recent populism.  Those critical of populist movements tend to emphasize ways in 
which the participants in those movements are ignorant, while those supportive of those 
movements tend to emphasize the ways in which they are ignored.  The first of these 
perspectives tempts us with a push towards more technocratic and trustee-like models of 
democratic governance, while the second of these perspectives tempts us with more direct and 
delegate-like models of democratic rule.   
From an epistemic point of view, we should look with skepticism toward both of these 
proposals.  When technocratic policy-making becomes badly decoupled from the every day 
perspective of citizens, failures of interest representation are inevitable, and the plight of low 
wage workers in advanced economies illustrates this point well. Yet sometimes the issues at 
hand are sufficiently complex that it is epistemically rational to keep the public at a certain 
technocratic remove.  Establishing more robust forms of public input, engagement, and 
contestation is not always instrumental to improving the fair and effective representation of 
interests, and this explains why Grillo’s “mouthpiece of the people” model of representation is a 
mistake. 
It is likely that, in some cases, a purely epistemic approach would push us past the dividing 
line between democracy and something more elitist.  In those instances, as I noted in my 
introduction, I accept that considerations of procedural fairness might kick in as a valid 
constraint on epistemic objectives.  A culture in which officials are accountable to citizens and 
obliged to explain and justify their use of power is plausibly quite valuable even if it is 
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epistemically sub-optimal.47  The argument above is not premised on any precise view about 
how the interaction between procedural and epistemic concerns operates.  I will only note that, at 
least conventionally, the general mandates of democratic procedural fairness are compatible with 
enormous variation in the degree and type of technocratic delegation.  Even apart from concerns 
about procedural fairness, the case of Grillo illustrates more pragmatic reasons for ensuring that 
citizens have some basic measure of voice in the process: when people believe that no one is 
listening to them, they will get pissed off and obstruct the democratic process.  So my point 
against Grillo is not that we should ignore the intrinsic and pragmatic value of citizens’ 
participation in the process; it is that we should not treat these as definitive of our model of 
representation. 
If citizens learn to embrace a democratic ideal that treats their involvement and direct 
authority as always and everywhere desirable, then achieving a healthy division of cognitive 
labor will become difficult, and society will need to continually soothe anxieties from the 
perceived unheard.  Populism thrives on a misguided epistemic egalitarianism, and transforms 
one important mechanism in democracy – citizen input and oversight – into a singular objective 
that crowds out other goods worth protecting. Political and civic maturity require a recognition 
that it is sometimes imperative to speak and be heard, and other times better to stand back and 
listen.  A theory of representation should be able to accommodate and explain this point.  
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